This paper investigates how di¤erent monetary policy regime switching types impact macroeconomic dynamics. Policy switches that either a¤ect the in ‡ation target or the response to in ‡ation deviations from target lead to di¤erent determinacy regions and di¤er-ent output, in ‡ation, and interest rate distributions. With regime switching, the standard Taylor Principle breaks down in multiple ways; satisfying the Principle period-by-period is neither necessary nor su¢ cient for determinacy. Switching in ‡ation targets primarily affects the economy's level, whereas switching in ‡ation responses a¤ects the variance. Even in periods with a …xed monetary policy rule, expectations of future policy switches produce di¤erent outcomes depending upon the switching type. Monetary authorities with given in ‡ation objectives need to adjust their policy parameters to counteract expectations of future policy switches.
Introduction
During the 1970s, the US economy experienced signi…cant macroeconomic volatility and a relatively high average in ‡ation rate. Then, during the early 1980s, the Federal Reserve under Volcker raised interest rates in an attempt to reduce the average in ‡ation rate and lower volatility. During the recent …nancial crisis and ensuing slow recovery, economists renewed debate about monetary policy objectives and the desirability of the Federal Reserve either relaxing its in ‡ation response or changing its in ‡ation target. Federal Reserve o¢ cials responded by suggesting some tolerance for in ‡ation above its 2% target, but without changing that target.
Other economists suggested a temporary increase in the in ‡ation target to a value in the 4-6% range (Rogo¤ (2008) , Blanchard et al. (2010) , and Ball (2013) ). In Japan, after more than a decade of de ‡ation and low growth, the Bank of Japan responded in 2013 by raising its in ‡ation target to 2% from its previous 1% in ‡ation "goal."
In the Volcker disin ‡ation example, a monetary policy switch possibly occurred, either to a lower in ‡ation target, an increased willingness to …ght in ‡ation deviations from target, or both.
In the recent US example, a policy switch could be to a higher in ‡ation target, a decreased willingness to …ght in ‡ation deviations from target, or both. In the Japan example, the change in a stated in ‡ation goal serves as an explicit switch (Romer (2013) ).
To the extent that policy switches occurred in the past and may occur again in the future, economic agents expect that changes can occur, and these expectations may a¤ect macroeconomic outcomes. Even if policy makers remain committed to their current objectives, future policy makers may have di¤erent objectives. In fact, public discourse about changing objectives potentially generates expectations of possible policy changes.
This paper examines what two di¤erent monetary policy switching assumptions -changing in ‡ation targets and in ‡ation responses -imply for macroeconomic dynamics. It allows for discrete changes in the monetary policy rule, both in the in ‡ation target and how strongly the monetary authority responds to in ‡ation deviations from target, and examines the economy's behavior when neither, one, or both policy parameters switch. It studies how policy switches a¤ect existence and uniqueness of the economy's equilibrium, and how the long-run distributions of macroeconomic variables change depending upon which parameters switch. It also examines the expectations e¤ects of the di¤erent switching types, and highlights how expectations of future policy switches can undermine monetary policy objectives such as low and stable in ‡ation, even if switches do not occur.
Much recent research considers how monetary policy impacts macroeconomic stability, including Woodford (2003) , Christiano et al. (2005) , and Smets and Wouters (2007) . Changes in the conduct of monetary policy and changes in macroeconomic performance led to debate over whether monetary policy remained …xed or changed over time. Using a Markov-switching vector autoregression (MS-VAR), Sims and Zha (2006) …nd support for …xed monetary policy with stochastic volatility rather than switching monetary policy. In a rational expectations framework, some research supports switches in in ‡ation targets (Schorfheide (2005) ), while some supports no switching in ‡ation target (Liu et al. (2011) ). In addition, several authors (Davig and Doh (2008) , Bianchi (2013) , and Chib et al. (2011) ) provide arguments for switches in the in ‡ation response. These papers typically only allow for one monetary policy switching type rather than both as considered here; this paper describes the di¤erences in macroeconomic behavior generated by these di¤erent assumptions.
The di¤erent monetary policy switching types have di¤erent determinacy implications. Determinacy -the existence and uniqueness of a stable equilibrium -represents an important consideration for the conduct of monetary policy. Faliure to achieve determinacy, Clarida et al. (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) argue, explains the higher macroeconomic volatility experienced during the 1970s. However, these two papers ignore the potential for repeated policy changes and the e¤ects of expectations. When the monetary policy rule switches over time, Davig and Leeper (2007) , Farmer et al. (2009), and Cho (2011) show the determinacy properties change relative to the case when the policy rule remains …xed. This paper makes two contributions regarding determinacy properties of models with switching parameters: …rst, it considers a model with predetermined variables rather than a purely forward looking model, and second, it considers in ‡ation target switching. Investigating determinacy previously required a forward looking model (Davig and Leeper (2007) , Farmer et al. (2009) ); models with predetermined variables either couldn't address determinacy (Svensson and Williams (2007) , Farmer et al. (2011) ), or had to disregard certain solution types (Cho (2011) ). In addition, Ascari and Ropele (2009) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) show that, in the presence of imperfect price indexation, models with di¤erent in ‡ation targets affect determinacy: high in ‡ation targets make determinacy less likely. This paper shows the standard Taylor Principle breaks down in multiple ways with regime switching: the degree of inertia in the monetary policy rule matters, and satisfying the Taylor Principle period-by-period represents neither a necessary nor a su¢ cient condition for achieving determinacy. Similar to models without switching, whether in ‡ation targets matter for determinacy depends upon the assumptions for price indexation; with full indexation, in ‡ation target switching does not impact determinacy, and without full indexation the average in ‡ation target matters, while the individual targets themselves do not.
In addition to determinacy, this paper shows that di¤erent monetary policy switching assumptions imply di¤erent macroeconomic variable distributions. Switching in the in ‡ation target primarily a¤ects the average output, in ‡ation, and interest rate in the economy, whereas in ‡ation response switching primarily a¤ects the variances. Importantly, these di¤erences depend both upon realized switches but also upon expectations: even in periods with a …xed monetary policy rule, di¤erent expectations about future monetary regimes produce di¤erent realizations of macroeconomic variables.
Since expectations of future monetary policy regimes a¤ect current outcomes, a monetary authority subject to switches may need to adjust its policy parameters to o¤set expectations and achieve certain objectives. Expectations of a switch to a higher in ‡ation target regime produce higher current in ‡ation, so the monetary authority needs to lower its stated in ‡ation target below its actual in ‡ation objective. Similarly, the monetary authority may need to react strongly to in ‡ation deviations in order to counteract expectations of a lower in ‡ation response in the future. Unfortunately, determinacy considerations limit the monetary authority's ability to counter expectations of a lower in ‡ation response in the future, and a monetary authority may not be able to fully counteract expectations of a su¢ ciently low in ‡ation response regime.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with regime switching, and the di¤erent switching types considered.
Section 3 discusses determinacy, examining the e¤ects of di¤erent switching assumptions on the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. Section 4 discusses the e¤ects of monetary policy switches on macroeconomic outcomes, considering both the long-run distributions and the role of expectations. Section 5 then discusses the implications of monetary policy switching and expectations for the conduct of monetary policy. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Model with Monetary Policy Regimes
This Section presents a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with sticky prices. Importantly, parameters governing the monetary policy rule change over time. In particular, the in ‡ation target and the parameter governing the reaction to in ‡ation follow independent Markov processes. The following subsections describe the model's several parts:
households, …nal goods producers, intermediate goods producers, the government, the monetary authority, aggregation conditions, and the stationary equilibrium, followed by the calibration and discussion of the solution method.
Households
A representative household chooses consumption C t , hours worked H t , and nominal bonds B t to maximize lifetime expected discounted utility
where E 0 denotes the expectations operator conditional on information at time t = 0. Perferences depend on the discount factor , the degree of risk aversion , the disutility of hours ', and the technology level A t . Households purchase bonds B t that pay out a nominal rate R t at t + 1, pay nominal lump sum taxes T t , earn a real wage W t , and receive real pro…ts from …rms D t . Consequently, they face the budget constraint
where P t denotes the price level.
Final Good Producer
A representative …rm combines a continuum of intermediate goods Y j;t indexed by j on the unit interval into a …nal good Y t using the CES technology
where denotes the elasticity of substitution between goods. The …rm takes the intermediate goods'prices P j;t as given and sells …nal output at the given price P t . Cost minimization implies the demand for intermediate goods depends upon the relative price and the quantity of the …nal good according to
The aggregate price level P t depends on the intermediate good prices P j;t by
Intermediate Goods Producers
Intermediate goods producers, indexed by j on the unit interval, produce di¤erentiated products Y j;t using hours H j;t according to the linear technology
where total factor productivity (TFP) A t follows a unit root process with drift ! log A t = ! + log A t 1 + a t ;
and the disturbance a t follows an autoregressive process
where " a;t N (0; 1) denotes a TFP shock.
Firms solve a two stage problem. In the …rst stage, they minimize labor costs W t H j;t subject to meeting demand (4) at the posted price P j;t . In the second stage, intermediate …rms adjust
prices according to Calvo with indexation. A …rm re-optimizes its price with probability 1 , and with probability it re-indexes its price according to steady-state in ‡ation: P j;t = ss P j;t 1 , where 2 [0; 1] denotes the degree of indexation. A value = 0 indicates no price indexation, while = 1 indicates full indexation to steady state in ‡ation. If a …rm re-optimizes in period t = 0, it chooses P 0 to maximize
where t is the household's marginal utility of consumption at time t, so t t = 0 denotes the stochastic discount factor from the household discounting pro…ts t periods into the future.
By Calvo pricing, the optimal relative price levelP t = P j;t =P t evolves according to
Fiscal Policy
The government purchases a fraction t of output Y t , so total government spending G t equals
The fraction of goods purchased satis…es
where g t follows an autoregressive process
where " g;t N (0; 1) denotes a government spending shock.
The government collects lump-sum taxes T t and issues bonds B t to cover spending G t and bond expenses R t 1 B t 1 :
Monetary Policy
Monetary policy follows a Taylor rule, meaning nominal rates follow 
where r ss denotes the steady state real rate. Finally, the monetary policy shock " r;t N (0; 1).
The time-varying rule allows for both a changing in ‡ation target s t , and changes in the in ‡a-tion response s t . These two parameters each follow independent two-state Markov processes.
The Markov variable s t 2 fH; Lg determines the in ‡ation target, so
the subscripts denote "high" and "low" in ‡ation targets. The transition matrix has elements
Similarly, the response of the monetary authority to the in ‡ation gap, s t , follows an independent two-state Markov process indexed by s t 2 fA; P g, so
the subscripts denote "active" and "passive" response regimes.
1
The transition matrix has elements P i;j = Pr s t = jjs t 1 = i :
Given that the two parameters have independent transitions with two regimes each, the economy has four total regimes
with the associated transition matrix
Aggregation
Market clearing implies that available production equals consumption C t plus government spend-
and the total available output equals
where the output loss due to price dispersion, denoted t , using Calvo pricing, follows
Stationary Equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of the …rst order conditions for the household and two types of …rms, the monetary authority's rule, the market clearing and aggregation conditions, and the exogenous 1 Typically the terms "active" and "passive" imply values greater than or less than one, respectively. Here, "active" simply refers to regimes with the stronger response and "passive" refers to a regime with the weaker response without implying values greater than or less than unity.
laws of motion. Since total factor productivity follows a unit root process (7), the model has a non-stationary equilibrium. Consequently, de…ne the de-trended variables
In terms of the de-trended variables, the economy has a stationary equilibrium and unique steady state. Appendix A shows the full set of stationary equilibrium conditions.
Parameterization
Having established the equilibrium, now consider the parameterization and alternative regime switching models. This paper considers four alternative models nested by the framework described above, which vary only in the transition matrices Q and P. Table 1 shows the parameters that remain …xed across models.
The unit of time equals a quarter, and the economy exhibits growth via the unit root with drift portion of the TFP process; ! = 0:005 implies a balanced growth path with output growing at a 2 percent annual rate. Given TFP growth, the discount factor equal to unity implies a 2 percent annual risk-free real rate. The disutility of hours ' = 45=32 so that in the model with full price indexation normalized output equals one in steady state. Government spending equals 20 percent of output in steady state, as determined by g ss = 1:25. The value = 1 implies …rms that cannot re-optimize prices index fully to steady state in ‡ation.
The in ‡ation target parameter switches between a low value L = 1:02 1 4 and a high value H = 1:04 1 4 , which correspond to annualized rates equalling 2% and 4%, respectively. The in ‡ation reaction parameter switches between an active value A = 3:0, and a passive value P = 0:95. Importantly, these reaction parameters would imply determinacy and indeterminacy, respectively, if considered independently without regime switching. In the current parameterization, the transition probabilities between regimes chosen guarantee determinacy.
Given the parameterizations and the regime switching among four total regimes -two target regimes and two response regimes -this paper considers four alternative models nested by the framework described above. The nesting of these alternative models depends upon the transition matrix, by choosing transition probabilities that prevent certain regimes from occurring. The four probabilities fQ LL ; Q HH ; P AA ; P P P g dictate which regimes can occur. Table 2 lists the four models and the transition probabilities.
The …rst model, the "no switching" model, has monetary policy always active and the in ‡ation target always low. In the second model, the "response switching" model, the low in ‡ation target always prevails, but the in ‡ation response switches between active and passive. In the third model, the "target switching" model, the in ‡ation target switches between high and low, but with a permanently active in ‡ation response. Finally, the fourth model, the "full switching" model, has the in ‡ation target switching between high and low, and the in ‡ation response switching between active and passive.
Solution Method
The presence of regime switching in the in ‡ation target as well as the in ‡ation response parameter introduces a discreteness in the model that makes typical linearization or perturbation techniques infeasible. The results in this paper use the perturbation method developed by Foerster et al. (2013) , which allows for general regime switching environments such as the one developed here. Perturbation also allows for checking the existence and uniqueness of the approximated solution; Section 3 uses this result in the discussion of determinacy. In addition, perturbation enables second-or higher-order approximations, which capture precautionary behavior and improve accuracy. The simulation results in Section 4 and 5 use second-order approximations to the log policy functions.
In the presence of in ‡ation target switching, the concept of steady state di¤ers slightly from that in a standard model. The steady state in ‡ation level ss equals the steady state in ‡ation target ss , which in turn equals the mean of the ergodic distribution of t implied by the transition matrix Q. In the baseline models without in ‡ation target switching ss = ss = 1:02 Using the solution method developed by Foerster et al. (2013) , this paper characterizes determinacy of MSV solutions with predetermined variables. Given a determinate MSV solution, other stable non-MSV solutions may exist, and characterizing a full set of determinacy conditions in the presence of regime switching remains an interesting line of research. However, given that estimation typically uses MSV solutions, focusing on determinacy in this restricted class represents an important step.
In order to characterize a set of parameters as producing a determinate equilibrium, there must exist a unique stable solution to the …rst-order approximation to the decision rules characterizing optimal behavior. Regime switching models allow for several potential stability definitions, unlike the constant parameter case where de…nitions coincide. Following Costa et al. (2005) , Farmer et al. (2009 ), Cho (2011 ), and Foerster et al. (2013 , among others, the determinacy results in this paper use the concept of mean square stability (MSS). The …rst-order solution to a general regime switching DSGE model has a state equation of the form
where x t 1 denotes predetermined variables for time t.
Mean square stability implies the process (27) has …nite …rst and second moments in expectation:
Importantly, MSS allows unbounded realizations of the paths for x t , so long as the process has …nite …rst and second moments in expectation. An alternative stability concept used by Davig and Leeper (2007) , bounded stability, requires bounded paths and hence eliminates temporarily explosive paths; this di¤erence generates di¤erent determinacy implications.
The dependence of the coe¢ cients H x (s t ), H " (s t ) and H (s t ) in equation (27) on the regime s t implies the standard stability condition -that H x has eigenvalues in the unit circle -breaks down. Costa et al. (2005) show the process (27) satis…es mean square stability if and only if the following matrix has all eigenvalues inside the unit circle:
where n x = dim (x t ). The fact that T depends upon the transition matrix P and the coe¢ cients in the state equation H x (s t ) makes analytic characterizations of determinacy conditions nearly impossible to obtain. Consequently, the following results use numerical search to characterize regions with a determinate versus indeterminate solution.
The following Sections consider the implications of switching for determinacy in the four di¤erent models. First, Section 3.1 discusses determinacy in the baseline models. In these models, price indexation makes in ‡ation targets irrelevant, in both the …xed the switching in ‡ation target cases. Under regime switching, the standard Taylor Principle of constant parameter models breaks down: one regime can imply indeterminacy if considered in isolation, but the model with switches can imply determinacy overall. In addition, both regimes can imply determinacy in isolation, but switching produces indeterminacy overall. Section 3.2 shows that, in contrast to the no switching model, in the presence of switching interest rate smoothing matters. Section 3.3 highlights that price indexation impacts the determinacy results by making the steady state in ‡ation target relevant for determinacy.
Determinacy in the Baseline Models
First consider determinacy in the baseline models, which have full price indexation to steady state in ‡ation. In the no-switching model, determinacy only depends on the in ‡ation response parameter: the well-known Taylor Principle that > 1 guarantees determinacy. In a model with full price indexation, the steady state in ‡ation target ss does not matter for determinacy.
In the other baseline models, the presence of full price indexation to steady state in ‡ation produces a similar result: determinacy does not depend on the target level of in ‡ation, a result that holds with both a constant and a switching target. The following Theorem formally states this fact.
Theorem 1 With full price indexation ( = 1), the steady state in ‡ation target level ss and the switching in ‡ation targets L and H do not a¤ect determinacy.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 1 implies that only the in ‡ation responses P and A and their transition matrix P a¤ect determinacy. The no switching model has the same determinacy properties as the target switching model, regardless of the in ‡ation targets. In addition, the response switching model and the full switching model have identical determinacy properties, regardless of the in ‡ation targets. Consequently, focusing on the case where only the in ‡ation response switches su¢ ciently characterizes determinacy in the baseline models with full price indexation ( = 1).
In the presence of regime-switching, the transition matrix between regimes P and the parameters in those regimes control determinacy. As a result, the Taylor principle does not need to hold every period. Davig and Leeper (2007) argue for a "Long-Run Taylor Principle:" the economy can move through regimes that would imply indeterminacy if considered in isolation, but the economy overall can have a determinate solution so long as the regimes implying determinacy o¤set those implying indeterminacy. Figure 1 shows a boundary region for determinacy with full indexation ( = 1) as the in ‡ation response parameters change. The plot depicts,
given an in ‡ation response for the active regime A , the minimum value of P that yields a determinate solution. Parameter combinations above a line generate a determinate equilibrium, solution which has an explosive regime. These parameters generate at least one solution that violates bounded stability, because if the explosive regime occurred forever along a realized path, the economy would permanently move away from steady state. With MSS, the economy can experience an explosive regime, because the other regime tends to rein in the explosive behavior.
Consequently, parameters between the two lines admit at least two MSS solutions: one in which the passive and active regimes both stabilize in ‡ation, and one in which the passive regime experiences explosive hyperin ‡ation that the active regime brings under control. Sargent et al.
(2009) point to regime switching as a possible explanation for South American hyperin ‡ation.
A second implication of the Long-Run Taylor Principle, the e¤ects of altering the transition probabilities, holds in the current setup. Figure 2 shows the determinacy boundary for P P P = 0:9 and P P P = 0:7 with P AA = 0:9 . When P P P = 0:9, the passive regime has a long expected duration, and so the response P needs to be relatively strong to ensure determinacy. When P P P = 0:7, the passive regime has shorter expected duration, and the response P can be weaker than when P P P = 0:9 for a given A , as seen in the downward shift in the determinacy boundary. However, when P P P = 0:9 and P AA = 0:7, the restrictions on P to guarantee determinacy work in the opposite direction: making the active regime less persistent leads to indeterminacy unless the passive regime has a stronger response.
Importantly, the case with P P P = 0:9 and P AA = 0:7 produces a result that highlights a second breakdown of the conventional Taylor Principle in the case of regime switching. With a particularly active policy parameter, in excess of 4, then determinacy actually requires a passive parameter P in excess of unity. In other words, with large A both regimes can satisfy the Taylor Principle in isolation, but switching produces indeterminacy. This result depends crucially on the use of MSS as a stability concept. Even though both regimes can imply determinacy when considered in isolation, a large discrepancy between how the di¤erent regimes react to deviations of in ‡ation from target can cause indeterminacy. In the …xed regime case, a passive response P slightly above one implies the monetary authority slowly stabilizes in ‡ation. With the presence of regime switching and a particularly strong active regime, indeterminacy results from a second possible solution in which in ‡ation drifts away from steady state while in the passive regime, with the expectation that the strong active regime will quickly bring in ‡ation back to steady state when a switch occurs.
These results suggest a monetary authority subject to switching faces two constraints on its in ‡ation response in order to avoid indeterminacy. First, given the switching probabilities, the in ‡ation response in the passive regime cannot respond to in ‡ation too weakly, since very passive policies tend to create indeterminacy. Second, the active regime cannot react too strongly to in ‡ation, since very active polices create indeterminacy by allowing explosive in ‡ation during the passive regime that will eventually be brought back under control upon a regime switch.
Determinacy and Interest Rate Smoothing
Section 3.1 shows that, under full indexation, in ‡ation target switching has no e¤ect on determinacy, so now consider how interest rate smoothing a¤ects only the no switching and response switching models. The presence of interest rate smoothing creates a backward-looking model. Figure 2 showed that the determinacy implications of switching between in ‡ation responses depends upon their expected duration as well as the strength or weakness of the response. In a model without switching, the standard Taylor Principle holds regardless the degree of interest rate smoothing: interest rate inertia doesn't a¤ect the long-run response to in ‡ation, so an in ‡a-tion response greater than unity guarantees determinacy. In the regime switching case, Figure 3 shows that the degree of interest rate smoothing does have an e¤ect on the determinacy region.
In the baseline case, r = 0:7; when r = 0:9 interest rates exhibit a strong degree of inertia; when r = 0 the model simpli…es to the purely forward looking case.
The Long-Run Taylor Principle in Davig and Leeper (2007) implies that, if a pair ( A ; P ) produces determinacy, then for all " > 0, both ( A + "; P ) and ( A ; P + ") produce determinate solutions. In other words, given a set of in ‡ation responses that produces determinacy, increasing one of those parameters will not produce indeterminacy. Figure 3 shows this result completely depends upon a forward looking model. When r = 0, the determinacy boundary does not increase as A increases. The determinacy regions with interest rates smoothing imply that beyond a certain point, as the active regime becomes more active, the passive regime also needs to become slightly more active as well in order to ensure determinacy. In e¤ect, the di¤erences in the in ‡ation responses A and P cannot be too large. As the di¤erence in the in ‡ation response increases, indeterminacy becomes more likely.
Two o¤setting reasons produce this result. With smoothing, deviations of the interest rate from target become more persistent. So with a low in ‡ation response, even if the economy switches to a more active regime, it will take longer to bring in ‡ation deviations down. On the other hand, an economy in the active regime that switches to the passive regime will take longer for in ‡ation deviations to become large. Consequently, higher interest rate smoothing has a way of increasing the strength of both the active and passive regimes. So when A nears 1, lowering the persistence from r = 0:9 to r = 0:7 mimics making the passive regime more persistent or the active regime less persistent. As A increases, lowering the persistence mimics making the passive regime less persistent and the active regime more persistent.
These results suggest that the ability of a monetary authority to set an active policy parameter A to o¤set a passive one P depend critically on the degree of interest rate inertia. A high degree of inertia suggests that the two regimes must be relatively similarly in in ‡ation responses to avoid indeterminacy. A lower degree of inertia tends to allow higher in ‡ation response in the active regime, given a passive regime's response.
Determinacy without Price Indexation
In the models with full price indexation ( = 1), higher steady state in ‡ation has no impact on determinacy, as shown in Theorem 1. However, as noted by Woodford (2003) Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 2 implies that only the average in ‡ation target matters for determinacy, since it determines the steady state in ‡ation level. Figure 4 shows the determinacy boundary for the response switching model, where the in ‡ation target it …xed at an annualized rate of 2%, for the cases with full indexation as discussed previously ( = 1) and for no indexation ( = 0).
Without indexation, the standard Taylor Principle breaks down. If the passive regime occurred in isolation determinacy requires P to exceed approximately 1:05; a positive output gap in steady state makes the higher value necessary. With regime switching, no indexation produces a parallel shift in the determinacy boundary relative to the case with full indexation. Without indexation, since responding to the output gap also a¤ects in ‡ation, for a given level of A , the minimum P to produce determinacy increases.
Since without indexation, determinacy depends upon the steady state in ‡ation target, Figure   4 shows the determinacy boundaries without indexation for a 3% steady state in ‡ation target.
The higher steady state in ‡ation target increases the steady state output gap, requiring a higher in ‡ation response around 1:07 if the passive regime occurred in isolation to o¤set the output gap response. With regime switching, a higher steady state in ‡ation target also represents a shift up in the determinacy boundary. Consequently, higher in ‡ation targets move the determinacy boundary upwards.
Finally, under full indexation, the output gap response does not matter for determinacy, but it does matter without full indexation. Figure 5 shows the determinacy boundaries with no indexation ( = 0) for di¤erent output gap responses . When the monetary authority does not respond to the output gap ( = 0), the determinacy region equals that for the case with full indexation -the standard Taylor Principle holds in the no switching case and the response switching model has a region identical to the one shown in Figure 2 . As the output gap response increases, the minimum P required in the no switching model increases, given the steady state trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output. With the presence of in ‡ation response switching, the rates. An explosive passive regimes will tend to increase in ‡ation even faster, making it di¢ cult for the active regime to reign in in ‡ation.
These results suggest that, in an economy without full indexation, a monetary authority with a higher steady state in ‡ation target makes indeterminacy more likely. However, given that the individual in ‡ation targets do not matter for determinacy, and only the average in ‡ation target does, the monetary authority can have regimes with high in ‡ation targets and still achieve determinacy by keeping those regimes infrequent or by o¤setting with a low in ‡ation target in the other regimes.
Monetary Switching and Macroeconomic Outcomes
After discussing how di¤erent monetary policy switching assumptions a¤ect determinacy, this Section examines how the di¤erent assumptions impact economic outcomes. Monetary policy switches a¤ect outcomes over two horizons: the long-run and the short-run. Long-run outcomes depend upon both realized switches and expectations formed over switching behavior. In the short-run, no monetary policy switches occur, so expectations alone drive any di¤erences in outcomes between the models. In this way, examining the di¤erences between the short and long run disentangles the e¤ects of realized switches from expectations about future switches. Leeper and Zha (2003) call the latter the expectation formation e¤ects, and Liu et al. (2009) show these e¤ects vary across regimes.
The following results use the perturbation solution method developed by Foerster et al. (2013) . Characterizing determinacy in Section 3 required this solution method, and the following results use two additional features that perturbation provides. First, perturbation provides a uni…ed framework for handling both sources of regime switching -in ‡ation target and in ‡ation response -with ease. Second, perturbation allows second-order approximations to the decision rules. In a constant parameter case, …rst-order approximations satisfy certainty equivalence, as pointed out by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), meaning the scale of the exogenous shocks does not impact the solution; second-order approximations break certainty equivalence, so the approximated decision rules re ‡ect the shocks'variances. In a regime-switching framework, Foerster et al. (2013) show switching parameters that a¤ect the economy's steady state -such as in ‡ation target switching -breaks the …rst-order approximation's certainty equivalence and has additional a¤ect on second-order approximations. Consequently, using second-order approximations improves accuracy in the presence of in ‡ation target switches. With in ‡ation response switching, the lack of certainty equivalence implies the approximation depends on the shocks' variance: agents internalize the fact that in ‡ation response switching a¤ects the economy's overall variance.
To characterize how switching a¤ects economic outcomes, this Section presents simulated distributions for normalized output, annualized in ‡ation, and the annualized nominal rate. Given the two nonlinearity types -the regime switching and the second-order approximation -characterizing these distributions requires simulation. 3 For each model, the distributions use 1000 simulations each lasting 50000 periods; a 1000 period burn-in eliminates any impact from initial conditions. The long-run distributions simulations allow regime switches to occur according to the relevant transition matrices. The short-run distributions do not allow switches: agents expect switching but switches do not occur along the simulated paths ex-post, meaning expectations produce di¤erent outcomes despite a …xed policy rule.
Switching and Long-Run Distributions
First consider how alternative switching types a¤ect the economy's long run distributions. These distributions re ‡ect both realized regime switches and expectation e¤ects. Figure 6 shows the simulated distributions for normalized output, annualized in ‡ation, and the annualized nominal rate for the four baseline models.
In the no switching model, the monetary policy rule remains …xed with a 2 percent in ‡ation target and an active in ‡ation response. In this case, the parameterization for the disutility of hours ' determines the steady state output level equaling unity. The distributions show relatively small variances around the output level equalling one, 2 percent annualized in ‡ation, and 4 percent annualized nominal rate -re ‡ecting a parametrized 2 percent annualized real rate plus 2 percent in ‡ation. The active in ‡ation response keeps output, in ‡ation, and the nominal rate relatively close to their steady state values. As previously noted, the second-order approximation lacks certainty equivalence, which generates an average interest rate slightly higher than the 4% steady state due to a households' precautionary motive, but this motive hardly impacts average output or average in ‡ation.
The response switching model produces means similar to the no switching model, but slightly di¤erent due to the fact that switching a¤ects the degree of certainty non-equivalence. In this model, the monetary authority experiences regimes with a passive in ‡ation response, leading to a larger degree of macroeconomic volatility. Response switching doubles output's volatility, more than doubles in ‡ation's volatility, and increases the standard deviation of annualized nominal rate by around 30%. These increased volatilities lead to only marginally lower output and interest rates and higher average in ‡ation rates, however, suggesting a very weak precautionary motive.
In the target switching model, the in ‡ation target switches between high and low values, but the in ‡ation response remains active. As a result, the average annual in ‡ation rate approximately equals 3%, re ‡ecting the fact that the monetary authority spends about half its time targeting 2% and 4% in ‡ation each. Importantly, target switching produces bimodal output and in ‡ation distributions. In ‡ation has peaks associated with each individual target, but both peaks sit between the 2% and 4% targets. Price indexation to steady state in ‡ation, 3% in this case, produces a bimodal output distribution. When the monetary authority targets 4% in ‡ation, indexation increases prices too little, leading to lower prices and hence higher output;
when the monetary authority targets 2% in ‡ation, indexation increases prices too much, leading to higher prices and lower output. The mean annualized interest rate slightly exceeds the 5% steady state rate, highlighting the lack of certainty equivalence. The standard deviations all exceed those for the no switching model, but not to the extent of the response switching model.
The model where both the in ‡ation target and the in ‡ation response switch blends the results from the two previously discussed models. Output and in ‡ation still have bimodal distributions but with a larger variance, leading to less pronounced peaks. This case has the largest standard deviations, as the two sources of monetary policy switching combine to produce the most macroeconomic volatility.
Expectation E¤ects: Switching and Short-Run Distributions
The long-run distributions re ‡ect realized monetary policy switches and expectations about those switches. Now consider short-run distributions, where agents expect that switching may occur, but the realized monetary policy rule remains …xed. In order to compare across the four di¤erent models, the following results consider distributions when monetary policy remains in the low in ‡ation target, active in ‡ation response regime. be lower, so that in ‡ation can become more persistent, and this expectation leads to changing price-setting and consumption behavior, leading to more volatile in ‡ation and interest rates.
In the target switching model, the expectation of policy switches leads to di¤erences in the averages of the distributions. Recall from Section 4.1 that in the low in ‡ation target regime, the indexation to steady state in ‡ation exceeds the target in ‡ation level. As a result, the average in ‡ation rate exceeds the in ‡ation target, generating a slight loss in average output from higher prices. Similarly, this case has an average interest rate higher than the 4% target. These di¤erences re ‡ect the fact that agents believe future monetary policy periods could have a high in ‡ation target, and so pricing and the nominal rate exceed that in the no switching model.
The resulting standard deviations roughly equal those in the no switching model, since agents expect an active in ‡ation response to continue forever.
Similar to the long-run distributions, the full switching model blends the results from the previous two models. Even though monetary policy has a low in ‡ation target and an active in ‡ation response, expectations of both switching types produce lower average output, and higher average in ‡ation and interest rates. The average output level of implies a small loss due to expectations of switching, only 0:16%, but expectations generate signi…cantly higher average in ‡ation and interest rates. The lack of certainty equivalence matters in this case, as this model has the highest volatility of in ‡ation and interest rates, leading to precautionary behavior that makes the average in ‡ation and interest rates the highest and average output the lowest.
These results show the expectation e¤ects matter for economic outcomes, not just in the standard deviations but in the average levels in the economy. In ‡ation and interest rates have particularly large changes, but output had a smaller change across models. In models with positive steady state in ‡ation, assumptions about price indexation can play a more important role in the output distribution.
Switching without Price Indexation
As discussed in Section 3.3, indexation plays a crucial role in determinacy of equilibria in the regime-switching models considered. Figure 9 shows the distributions of the variables conditional on being in the regime with an in ‡ation target of 2% and an active in ‡ation response, analogous to Figure 7 , without price indexation ( = 0). As with the long-run distributions, no price indexation generates a leftward shift in the output distributions and the rightward shift in the in ‡ation distributions. In the full switching model, expectation e¤ects lower output by 0:3% on average, simply because agents expect that monetary policy could switch to a higher in ‡ation target, to a passive in ‡ation response, or both.
Switching and Implications for Monetary Policy
The results of Section 4 show that expectations about future monetary policy regime switches can a¤ect the realizations of in ‡ation, even if those regime switches never occur. In addition, the determinacy results in Section 3 imply that monetary policy the passive regime can often constrain the active regime -setting too strong of an in ‡ation response can lead to indeterminacy. This Section discusses some of the implications for the results on determinacy and the expectation e¤ects on the conduct of monetary policy. Debortoli and Nunes (2011) show that regime switches in policy makers'preferences alter optimal policy by forcing policy makers to internalize the fact that regime switches a¤ect economic behavior. The following results pursue a similar objective, but focusing on both switching in ‡ation targets and in ‡ation responses, and by considering the implications for determinacy.
In particular, …rst consider a monetary authority setting the parameter L in each model.
If agents believe there will never be regime changes or only the in ‡ation response will change, then in ‡ation will roughly equal an annualized rate of 2% as shown in Figure 7 . However, if agents expect the in ‡ation target to switch to H implying 3% annual in ‡ation, then expectation e¤ects will push average annualized in ‡ation to roughly 2:26% even when switches do not occur.
In other words, the monetary authority, setting a 2% in ‡ation target, misses that objective on average. Therefore, if monetary authority has a 2% average in ‡ation objective, they will have to decrease L in order to o¤set the expectation e¤ects. Figure 10 shows how a monetary authority wishing to average 2% in ‡ation needs to set L in order to o¤set the expectation e¤ects for the target switching and full switching models, given various levels of annualized in ‡ation implied by H . In the target switching model, as H increases, the monetary authority needs to decrease the annualized rate implied by L by approximately 0:15 for each percentage point. So, if H increases from implying 2% to 3% on an annual basis, then L must decrease from implying 2% to around 1:85% annually to achieve 2% annualized in ‡ation. In the full switching model, the presence of changes in the in ‡ation response increases the volatility of in ‡ation, leading to more precautionary price-setting and slightly higher realized in ‡ation, so the monetary authority must actually o¤set H by even more, 0:2 per percentage point in this case. As an example, Japan recently raised it's in ‡ation target to 2%, but continues to achieve in ‡ation lower than that target. These results suggest that if markets do not view the new target as permanent, but instead expect monetary policy to resort to a lower target again in the future, then the Bank of Japan may need to pursue a target even higher than 2% in order to o¤set these expectations and achieve 2% in ‡ation.
Now consider a monetary authority concerned with the standard deviation of in ‡ation, and setting the active in ‡ation response parameter at the baseline level A = 3:0. If agents expect no regime changes, the standard deviation of in ‡ation equals the relatively low value of 0:4130, as shown in the no switching model in Figure 7 . However, if agents expect a switch to a regime of passive in ‡ation response of P -either the response switching or no switching models -then expectation e¤ects make the realized standard deviations of in ‡ation increase by around 25% to over 0:53, even without regime switching actually occurring. In other words, the monetary authority setting A to achieve the lower standard deviation consistently misses on its objective.
If the monetary authority wants to produce a standard deviation of annualized in ‡ation of 0:4130, it will have to increase A in order to o¤set the expectation e¤ects of switching to P .
However, as shown in Section 3, determinacy considerations may limit to their ability to o¤set the expectation e¤ects, since, given P , raising A too high can produce indeterminacy. Figure 11 shows how a monetary authority wishing to have an in ‡ation standard deviation of 0:4130 needs to set A in order o¤set the expectation e¤ects for the target switching and full switching models given P . The …gure shows a nonlinear relationship between P and A : as the passive response P gets smaller, the amount by which the monetary authority needs to increase A increases, since the lower passive response tends to increase the volatility of in ‡ation.
In the case where both the in ‡ation target and in ‡ation response switch, the monetary authority needs to o¤set the additional increase in in ‡ation volatility from in ‡ation target switches. This additional source of variation means the authority needs an even higher value of A to achieve the desired in ‡ation volatility volatility. Importantly, given a passive in ‡ation response below approximately P = 0:90 in both cases, then the active response cannot be set in order to o¤set the expectation e¤ects, since continued increases in A imply indeterminacy.
These results suggest that a monetary authority subject to expectations of future switching may face severe constraints on its ability to stabilize in ‡ation. If future monetary regimes have relatively low in ‡ation responses, then the active regime must become increasingly stronger in order to counteract lower passive responses. With a su¢ ciently weak passive regime, the active regime cannot hit its target; the active regime needs to be very high, but such a response creates indeterminacy. 
Conclusion
Monetary policy rules tend to change over time; using a new Keynesian model, this paper discussed the implications for di¤erent types of monetary policy switches on determinacy, the longrun behavior of the economy, how expectations about future regimes a¤ect current outcomes, and the implications for monetary policy. In the presence of parameter switches, standard Taylor Principle results fail to hold; determinacy can result even when one regime implies indeterminacy, and indeterminacy can result even when both regimes imply determinacy. The long-run distributions depend upon the type of switches: varying in ‡ation responses changes the variance of the economy, whereas varying in ‡ation targets move the averages. This result also holds for the e¤ects of expectations, since agents with rational expectations about future regime changes alter their behavior based upon these expectations, leading to di¤erent outcomes based upon the type of expected switches. Finally, a monetary authority wishing to o¤set the expectations of future monetary regimes will have to adjust its in ‡ation target or in ‡ation response depending upon the alternative regimes.
Several open questions remain for future investigation. The model considered here assumes constant probabilities of changing regimes. However, these probabilities may actually depend upon economic outcomes, such as the threshold model of Davig and Leeper (2008) . In addition, determining whether in ‡ation target or in ‡ation response switches occurred in US history ultimately represents an empirical question. Finally, a framework where optimal policy generates a switching rule remains an interesting consideration.
Appendix A: Equilibrium Conditions
This Appendix shows the full set of stationary equilibrium conditions. The household has three optimality conditions 1
and ' =~ tWt ;
where t denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the household's budget constraint (2), and~ t = t A t . Firms also have three optimality conditions: 
Government spending satis…esG t = tỸ t ;
and the resource constraints requireỸ
and
where the output loss due to price dispersion follows 
Finally, four exogenous processes drive the economy
a t = a a t 1 + " a;t ; (44)
and log g t = 1 g log g ss + g log g t 1 + g " g;t :
